

MARITIME RISK INTELLIGENCE REPORT

Weekly Maritime Security Risk Briefing

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1. Executive Summary ()

As of June 27, 2026, the Strait of Hormuz experienced another sharp reversal over the past week. After President Trump announced a renewed Israel-Hezbollah ceasefire on June 19, Israel continued strikes in southern Lebanon, prompting Iran to declare the next day, June 20, that it was reclosing the strait, citing this as a violation of the agreement (a claim the US military denied). Yet today (6/27), JMIC announced an expanded transit route near Omani waters, effectively challenging Iran's claimed control over the waterway, while actual traffic recorded 40 vessels (24 inbound, 16 outbound) on June 27 alone, continuing the recovery trend.

At the same time, IMO's 11,000-seafarer evacuation plan, announced on June 23, has reportedly been paused — the exact reason remains unclear. On the ground, a Panama-flagged VLCC was struck by a drone near Khasab, Oman on June 27, sustaining minor damage, reinforcing the assessment that 'kinetic risk persists even post-ceasefire.' Separately, the Red Sea remains uncertain as the Houthi ban on Israeli shipping continues, with carriers like CMA CGM reverting some Suez routes back to the Cape of Good Hope. The overall risk score stands at 3.3/5.0 (ELEVATED), a slight rise from last week.

2. Situation Overview ()


Confirmed Facts	Iran declared reclosure 6/20 (denied by US military); JMIC announced expanded Oman-area route 6/27; 40 transits recorded 6/27 (24 in/16 out); Panama VLCC struck by drone same day (minor damage)
Reported Information	IMO evacuation operation reportedly paused (reason unclear); ~100 IRGC fast-boats observed moving north mid-strait, the highest weekly count in recent weeks; IRGC naval facility at Bandar Abbas shows signs of reactivation
Analytical Judgment	Despite Iran's reclosure declaration, actual transit volume is trending upward — a growing gap between declared and actual control. The US appears to be testing this gap via the expanded Oman route
Information Gaps	Exact reason for the IMO evacuation pause; whether Iran's reclosure declaration will translate into actual military action; what simultaneous dual-berth loading at Kharg Island signals about Iran's export normalization intent

3. Geographic Risk Zone ()

Hormuz experienced an exceptionally volatile week in June, cycling through a SEVERE-to-SUBSTANTIAL downgrade, a reclosure declaration, and a route expansion announcement in rapid succession. The Red Sea remains split among carriers as the Houthi ban on Israeli shipping persists.

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Strait of Hormuz (core)	SUBSTANTIAL	SEVERE (volatility returns)	Reclosure declared, then route expansion — mixed signals
Omani waters (expanded route)	MODERATE	HIGH (being tested)	US Navy route expansion, possible Iranian pushback
Persian Gulf (overall)	HIGH	HIGH	Dual-berth loading at Kharg, some backlog clearing
Red Sea / Bab el-Mandeb	HIGH	HIGH	Houthi ban persists, carriers split on routing
Suez Canal route	MODERATE	MODERATE	CMA CGM reverts some routes to Cape
South China Sea	MODERATE	MODERATE	No change



4. Key Threat Actors ()

Iran (IRGC)	Reassert control over the Strait, continue boarding inspections	Declared reclosure 6/20; ~100 fast-boats observed moving north; Bandar Abbas reactivation
United States (NAVCENT/JMIC)	Challenge Iranian control, expand coordinated transit without escort	Announced expanded Oman-area route 6/27; officially denied the reclosure
IMO	Execute seafarer evacuation operation	11,000-seafarer plan announced, then paused (reason unclear)
Houthis (Ansar Allah)	Maintain ban on Israeli shipping	Separate Red Sea front, threat persists independent of Hormuz developments
Major carriers (CMA CGM, etc.)	Risk-averse route adjustments	Reverted some routes from Suez back to Cape

5. Affected Vessel Types ()

VLCCs/large tankers (Omani approaches)		6/27 Panama VLCC drone strike, hit shortly after emerging from a dark period
Iranian-flagged vessels (Kharg loading)		Includes OFAC-sanctioned vessels; both terminals loading simultaneously
Container/tankers (Israel-linked)		Continues as primary Houthi target in Red Sea
General container ships (Suez transit)		Carrier risk assessments diverge
General bulk/cargo carriers		Relatively lower priority

6. Threat Typology ()

Threat Type	Hormuz/Oman	Red Sea
Declared blockade vs. actual transit	Widening gap (reclosure declared, traffic rising)	Not applicable
Drone attacks	Confirmed (6/27 VLCC strike)	Houthi threat persists
Fast-boat activity	~100 observed moving north, weekly peak	Precedent exists
GPS/navigation jamming	Dark-period pattern continues	Sporadic
Vessel boarding/transit conditions	IRGC pre-coordination model maintained	Targeting Israel-linked vessels
Evacuation operation disruption	IMO operation paused	Not applicable

7. Shipping and Logistics Impact (.)

On June 27 alone, 40 vessels transited the Strait of Hormuz (24 inbound, 16 outbound), with approximately 4.1 million barrels of crude moving outbound. At Kharg Island, both export terminals resumed simultaneous loading for the first time since the June 20-22 OFAC sanctions event, signaling Iran's intent to clear its backlog. However, 28 vessels (27 of them dark) remain in the eastern waiting area.

In the Red Sea, CMA CGM reverted some Asia-Europe routes (FAL1, FAL3, MEX) back to Cape of Good Hope routing, citing a 'complex and uncertain international context.' Asia-Europe freight rates remain 25-40% above pre-crisis levels, and the share of east-to-west cargo via Suez stands at 18.7%, roughly in line with the two-year average — still far from full normalization.

8. Marine Insurance Impact ()

Category	Detail
Hormuz war risk premium	Volatility has widened since the reclosure declaration, pausing the steady downward trend

JMIC rating volatility	Oscillating between SEVERE and SUBSTANTIAL, complicating insurer rate-setting
P&I; Club actions	72-hour notice coverage cancellation clauses maintained, reflecting mine/drone risk
Red Sea war risk premium	\$150,000-\$300,000+/voyage; CMA CGM's Cape reversion signals weakening market confidence
Carrier profitability	Global freight rates projected to fall up to -25% in 2026; a Red Sea return would add further pressure
DFC political risk insurance	US International Development Finance Corporation's Hormuz transit support program remains active

9. Legal and Regulatory Considerations (.)

Declaration vs. effectiveness: Despite Iran's 6/20 reclosure declaration, 40 actual transits were recorded on 6/27, suggesting the legal requirement for an effective blockade (actual enforcement) is not being met. This gap could become a central issue in future disputes over the blockade's legal force.

Legal significance of the US route expansion: JMIC's announcement of an expanded route near Omani waters is widely interpreted as a direct challenge to Iran's claimed redefinition of the Strait as a 'broad operational area.' As the route lies within Omani territorial waters, UNCLOS transit passage rights apply, though actual safety still depends on Iranian acquiescence.

CONWARTIME application: Renewed volatility in Hormuz is expected to increase demand this week for renegotiating war risk clauses in new charter agreements.

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10. Risk Score ()

Hormuz volatility (declaration vs. reality)	4 / 5	Reclosure declaration and rising transit volume occurring simultaneously — a contradictory situation
Risk of confrontation over Oman route expansion	3 / 5	De facto US-Iran test of control
IMO evacuation operation disruption	3 / 5	Pause reason unclear, seafarer safety concerns
Red Sea Houthi threat	4 / 5	Ban on Israeli shipping persists, slow carrier confidence recovery
Carrier profitability pressure	3 / 5	Double bind of falling rates and Red Sea return risk
Concurrent drone/fast-boat activity	4 / 5	VLCC strike, ~100 IRGC fast-boats observed — sustained kinetic risk

11. Scenario Outlook ()

Best Case	Low	Iran's reclosure declaration does not translate into action; US Oman route expansion takes hold; IMO evacuation operation resumes
Base Case	High	Gap between declared blockade and actual transit persists; sporadic drone/fast-boat incidents occur but full-scale confrontation is avoided
Worst Case	Medium	Iran converts its reclosure declaration into actual military action (additional mine-laying, fast-boat attacks), reigniting direct US-Iran confrontation

12. Recommended Mitigation Measures ()

Vessel Owners / Operators	When using the expanded Oman route, verify the latest JMIC/NAVCENT advisories immediately before transit Exercise heightened vigilance for transits shortly after dark periods, given the 6/27 VLCC drone strike precedent Confirm IMO evacuation operation status before finalizing departure plans
Charterers / Cargo Owners	Renegotiate CONWARTIME clauses in new charter agreements in light of renewed Hormuz volatility Monitor CMA CGM and other carriers' Cape-reversion trends for Red Sea-bound cargo
Marine Insurers / P&I; Clubs	Adopt weekly reassessment rather than fixed rates given JMIC's SEVERE-SUBSTANTIAL oscillation Consider designating the drone strike location (near Khasab, Oman) as a special risk zone
Crew Management Organizations	Recommend refraining from new Persian Gulf entries until clear information on the IMO evacuation pause is obtained Strengthen welfare monitoring for seafarers already designated for evacuation
Government / Coast Guard	Urgently distribute guidance for Korean-flagged vessels on using the expanded Oman route Assess impact on Korean seafarer safety once the IMO evacuation pause reason is officially confirmed

13. Confidence Level ()

Confidence: High. Cross-verified across multiple sources including Wikipedia (2026 Strait of Hormuz crisis, real-time updates), the official IMO media center, Windward MIOC daily intelligence (6/27), Hellenic Shipping News/Skuld maritime security updates, S&P; Global, Maritime Executive, gCaptain, and Suaid Global. Specific events on 6/27 (the VLCC strike, JMIC route expansion, transit figures) were confirmed via Windward MIOC's real-time intelligence feed.

14. Information Gaps ()

- Exact reason for and expected resumption timeline of the paused IMO evacuation operation for 11,000 stranded seafarers
- Whether Iran's 6/20 reclosure declaration will translate into actual military action (e.g., additional mine-laying)
- Iran's official response to and countermeasures against JMIC's announced Oman route expansion
- Whether simultaneous dual-berth loading at Kharg Island signals a broader Iranian export normalization strategy or a temporary occurrence
- Confirmation of the attacking party behind the 6/27 VLCC drone strike (direct Iranian involvement vs. a proxy actor)
- Routing decisions of other major carriers beyond CMA CGM regarding the Red Sea

This report is based on publicly available sources (Wikipedia, IMO, Windward MIOC, Hellenic Shipping News, Skuld, S&P; Global, Maritime Executive, gCaptain, Suaid Global, etc.). For actual navigation, insurance, or legal decisions, consultation with the latest UKMTO/JMIC advisories and relevant professional experts is recommended.