

# MARITIME RISK INTELLIGENCE REPORT

## Weekly Maritime Security Risk Briefing

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### 1. Executive Summary ( )

As of June 22, 2026, both the Strait of Hormuz and the Red Sea remain in high-risk status simultaneously. The Hormuz crisis, which began on February 28, has now entered its fourth month. JMIC (Joint Maritime Information Center) downgraded the threat level from CRITICAL to SEVERE on June 7, but explicitly stated this reflects an increase in safe transits via the southern route through Omani waters rather than genuine normalization. Real-time tracking shows outbound commercial traffic through the Strait has remained near zero for several consecutive days.

Simultaneously, the Red Sea threat picture sharpened again after the Houthis reinstated a total ban on Israeli shipping on June 8. This coincided with renewed direct Israel-Iran hostilities and the collapse of the fragile ceasefire that had held since April 8. With the Hormuz crisis now in its fourth month and the Red Sea front destabilizing simultaneously, a dual-chokepoint crisis has formed, affecting roughly 12% of global maritime trade.

### 2. Situation Overview ( )


Confirmed Facts	JMIC downgraded Hormuz from CRITICAL to SEVERE on 6/7; Houthis reinstated total ban on Israeli shipping on 6/8; near-zero real-time transit through Hormuz
Reported Information	'Coordinated passage' model operating via Omani territorial waters; US CENTCOM unofficially claims ~1,000 transits over the past two months
Analytical Judgment	Hormuz is in a 'gradual managed-transit exploration phase'; Red Sea is 're-entering the 2024 crisis pattern' — neither is close to normalization
Information Gaps	Unclear whether the JMIC downgrade reflects an actual threat reduction or a change in assessment criteria; unconfirmed whether the Houthi ban has resulted in actual attacks

### 3. Geographic Risk Zone ( )

The Strait of Hormuz has been a sustained, four-month-long conflict zone since the crisis began on February 28, while the Red Sea was relatively quiet following the April 8 ceasefire before reigniting on June 8. Both regions designate the Persian Gulf and Yemeni coastal waters as core high-risk zones.

Strait of Hormuz	CRITICAL	SEVERE	Slight easing (rating)
Red Sea / Bab el-Mandeb	MODERATE (ceasefire)	HIGH	Sharp deterioration
Persian Gulf (overall)	CRITICAL	SEVERE	Slight easing
Gulf of Oman (bypass route)	HIGH	MODERATE	Easing (coordinated transit operating)

Gulf of Aden	MODERATE	HIGH	Deterioration
South China Sea	MODERATE	MODERATE	No change



#### 4. Key Threat Actors ( )

Actor	Actions	Impacts
Iran (IRGC)	Assert control over the Strait, blockade 'unfriendly' nations	Continued mine-laying and fast-boat seizure operations; claims of 'complete control'
United States (NAVCENT)	Blockade Iranian ports, escort operations	Enforced Iran port blockade Apr 13–May 29; exercising right of visit on transiting vessels
Houthis (Ansar Allah)	Iranian alliance, renewed pressure on Israel	Declared total ban on Israeli shipping 6/8, resumed missile attacks
Israel	Deter Iranian/Houthi threats	Continued retaliatory strikes, including on Mahshahr petrochemical complex in Iran
Oman	Provide neutral transit corridor	Cooperating on coordinated-transit model via territorial waters

## 5. Affected Vessel Types ( )

Tankers (attempting Hormuz transit)		Risk of Iranian boarding/seizure, mine threats; 17+ vessels damaged to date
Container/tankers (Israel-linked)		Primary Houthi target since 2023-24
LNG carriers (Hormuz)		Traffic down 99%, high-value target
Tugs and small support vessels		One tug sunk in Hormuz incident
General bulk/cargo carriers		Lower priority target, advised to reroute

## 6. Threat Typology ( )

Threat Type	Hormuz	Red Sea
Missile attacks	Ongoing Iran-Israel exchanges	Houthi attacks resumed (6/8)
Sea mines	Confirmed, multiple deployments	Not applicable / limited
Fast-boat seizures	Confirmed, IRGC-led operations	Precedent exists
Drone/USV attacks	Confirmed	Same
Vessel boarding/detention	Iran's 'friendly nations only' policy	Targeting Israel-linked vessels
GPS/navigation jamming	MARAD advisory issued (mandatory Doppler logs in some cases)	Sporadic

## 7. Shipping and Logistics Impact ( . )

Between February 28 and June 1, crude oil tanker transits through Hormuz fell by 95%, and LNG carrier transits by 99%. Approximately 2,000 vessels and 20,000 seafarers remain stranded in the Persian Gulf in a prolonged standoff. US CENTCOM unofficially claims approximately 1,000 transits occurred over the past two months, though this figure diverges sharply from private-sector tracking data.

In the Red Sea, major carriers that had begun resuming Trans-Suez operations in recent months have once again suspended their return following the June 8 ban. Hapag-Lloyd halted Trans-Suez sailings and reverted to Cape of Good Hope routing, while the Maersk-Hapag Lloyd Gemini alliance rescinded related route structures.

## 8. Marine Insurance Impact ( )

Category	Detail
Hormuz war risk premium	3-8% of vessel value (large tankers: \$3M-\$8M per voyage)
Hormuz premium (pre-crisis)	Approximately 0.25% of vessel value
Tanker daily charter rates	Up to 4x normal levels, peaking near \$800,000/day

Red Sea war risk premium	Renewed upward pressure, expected \$150,000-\$300,000+/voyage
P&I; Club actions	All 12 International Group P&I; Clubs maintain partial coverage cancellations with 72-hour notice
LMA official position	Maintains that reduced traffic stems primarily from safety concerns, not insurance unavailability

## 9. Legal and Regulatory Considerations ( )

**Legal Requirements for Blockade:** Under ICRC standards, a binding blockade must be effectively enforced, formally declared, specify scope and duration, and be notified to neutral states. Whether Iran's 'blockade of unfriendly nations' declaration meets these requirements remains a contested legal question.

**Freedom of Navigation:** Transit passage rights through Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb are guaranteed under UNCLOS Article 38, but legal entitlement and practical safety diverge sharply given the de facto control exercised by armed actors (Iranian IRGC, Houthis).

**US Blockade Operations:** The US blockade of Iranian ports (April 13-May 29) was stated not to target Hormuz transit itself, but its exercise of boarding/inspection rights over all-flag vessels raises unresolved questions regarding neutral vessel status.

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## 10. Risk Score ( )

Hormuz normalization likelihood	2 / 5	Four months of sustained blockade; rating downgrade is limited improvement
Red Sea Houthi threat resurgence	4 / 5	Total ban on Israeli shipping reinstated
Iran-Israel escalation risk	4 / 5	Direct hostilities resumed; April ceasefire collapsed
Insurance market shock	5 / 5	Hormuz premiums up to 32x pre-crisis levels
Seafarer/humanitarian risk	4 / 5	20,000 seafarers stranded long-term; casualties reported
Logistics recovery pace	2 / 5	Near-term normalization unlikely in either region

: 3.8 / 5.0 | : HIGH (Simultaneous dual-chokepoint crisis, near-term normalization unlikely)

## 11. Scenario Outlook ( )

Best Case	Low	Iran-Israel ceasefire re-established, Houthi ban lifted, Hormuz resumes phased normal transit
Base Case	High	Hormuz continues limited operation under 'coordinated transit' model; Red Sea sees sporadic attacks and threats
Worst Case	Medium	Houthi blockade threat against Bab el-Mandeb materializes; both regions face simultaneous full closure and escalation

## 12. Recommended Mitigation Measures ( )

Vessel Owners / Operators	Hormuz: Do not transit independently without prior NAVCENT NCAGS coordination; maintain 30nm standoff from US naval vessels Red Sea: Israel/US/UK-linked vessels should fully suspend entry
Charterers / Cargo Owners	Review alternative supply routes (e.g., overland pipelines) for Hormuz-bound cargo Default to Cape of Good Hope routing for Red Sea-bound cargo
Marine Insurers / P&I; Clubs	Maintain elevated Hormuz rates absent a sustained stability period Immediately reassess Red Sea rates in light of the June 8 development
Crew Management Organizations	Develop welfare and rotation plans for the 20,000 seafarers stranded in the Persian Gulf Coordinate with IMO/ITF to secure supply routes for food, fuel, and crew changes
Government / Coast Guard	Recommend full reassessment of Korean-flagged vessel entry into both regions Maintain daily monitoring of UKMTO, JMIC, and MARAD advisories

## 13. Confidence Level ( )

Confidence: High. Cross-verified across multiple primary and secondary sources including JMIC (via Hellenic Shipping News), Wikipedia (2026 Strait of Hormuz crisis/campaign), official MARAD advisories, Bloomberg, gCaptain, Insurance Journal, Jerusalem Post, and real-time data from hormuztracking.com. The discrepancy between real-time Hormuz transit data and unofficial US military statistics is noted separately as an information gap.

## 14. Information Gaps ( )

- Unclear whether JMIC's CRITICAL-to-SEVERE downgrade reflects a genuine reduction in threat or a change in assessment methodology
- Significant discrepancy between CENTCOM's claim of ~1,000 transits over two months and near-zero figures from private tracking data
- Unconfirmed whether the Houthi June 8 ban has resulted in actual attacks, and whether any vessels have been damaged
- Specific operational procedures and vessel eligibility for the 'coordinated transit' model via Oman remain unclear
- Diplomatic mediation prospects for further escalation or ceasefire in the direct Iran-Israel conflict
- Specific humanitarian support measures in place for the 20,000 seafarers stranded in the Persian Gulf

This report is based on publicly available sources (JMIC/Hellenic Shipping News, Wikipedia, MARAD, Bloomberg, gCaptain, Insurance Journal, Jerusalem Post, hormuztracking.com, etc.). For actual navigation, insurance, or legal decisions, consultation with the latest UKMTO/JMIC advisories and relevant professional experts is recommended.