Introduction

The Korea Coast Guard (KCG) is exploring the adoption of unmanned autonomous vessels to enhance maritime security and operational effectiveness. Unmanned surface vessels (USVs) – sometimes called autonomous or remote-controlled boats – can conduct patrol, surveillance, and search-and-rescue missions without putting personnel at risk. Recently, the KCG has partnered with domestic research institutes to develop and test USVs like the Aragon 3 for tasks such as monitoring illegal fishing and responding to maritime incidents. These efforts align with global trends in maritime technology, as many nations recognize the potential of autonomous vessels to extend reach and persistence in maritime domain operations. This report provides a structured analysis of the operational benefits of unmanned autonomous vessels for the KCG, examines the cybersecurity threats and risks associated with their deployment (such as hacking and GPS spoofing), compares international approaches to autonomous maritime systems and cyber resilience, and offers policy recommendations for safe and secure implementation. The tone and structure are maintained in a formal manner befitting an official policy document intended for government stakeholders.

Operational Benefits of Unmanned Autonomous Vessels

Unmanned autonomous vessels offer several operational advantages that can significantly augment Coast Guard capabilities. These benefits include improved safety for personnel, cost efficiencies, and enhanced mission performance:

• 24/7 Persistent Operations: Unlike crewed patrol boats, autonomous vessels can operate continuously without fatigue. They do not require crew rotations or rest, enabling round-the-clock surveillance and rapid response. As one industry expert noted, “No one can work 24 hours a day… Autonomous boats can just go out to sea continuously, without resting”, allowing constant patrolling of maritime areasship.nridigital.com. This persistent presence is invaluable for monitoring vast ocean areas and deterring illicit activities at all hours.
• Reduced Risk to Human Life: Deploying unmanned vessels minimizes the exposure of KCG officers to dangerous and hostile environments. USVs can be sent into high-risk situations – such as confronting armed criminals, navigating hazardous weather, or entering contaminated areas – without endangering crew. They can operate in dangerous or complex environments “without having to worry about crew safety”ship.nridigital.com. For example, an autonomous vessel could inspect a suspected vessel carrying hazardous materials or patrol a treacherous shoal in bad weather, tasks that would be perilous for human crews.
• Cost Efficiency and Force Multiplication: By eliminating onboard crew requirements, autonomous vessels can lower operational costs over time. They reduce the need for large crews and life-support systems on every patrol asset. According to industry analysis, using USVs can be cheaper than manned vessels due to savings on personnel and support, especially for routine security patrolsship.nridigital.com. Additionally, unmanned vessels act as force multipliers – a single remote operator or a small team can supervise multiple USVs, expanding surveillance coverage without proportional increases in manpower. This is especially useful for the KCG, which must cover Korea’s expansive maritime zones with limited resources.
• Rapid Deployment and Flexibility: Autonomous vessels typically have shorter preparation and launch times. They can be pre-positioned and activated quickly from a control center. In practice, an operator can “push a button at the control center and the boat can go by itself,” requiring only a few minutes to deploy, much faster than the 15 minutes or more often needed to mobilize a manned crewship.nridigital.com. This rapid responsiveness means the KCG can react swiftly to time-sensitive incidents (e.g. a distress signal or fast-moving illegal activity). Moreover, USVs can be designed in various sizes – from small rigid-hull boats to larger craft – allowing flexibility to tailor the vessel to specific missions like coastal surveillance, port security, or offshore search and rescue.
• Enhanced Surveillance and Capabilities: Modern autonomous vessels come equipped with advanced sensors (radar, sonar, infrared cameras) and communication systems for real-time data relay. They can maintain a persistent maritime domain awareness picture and even be integrated with aerial drones or command centers. Some models can also carry specialized payloads (e.g. loudspeakers to warn intruders, searchlights, or even non-lethal deterrents). In port security scenarios, USVs have been used to patrol waters where fixed cameras or human patrols have blind spots, effectively “performing patrol operations… controlling the whole port” in coordination with other surveillance systemsship.nridigital.com. This technology-driven approach can greatly enhance the KCG’s ability to detect and respond to suspicious vessels or emergencies in real time.

In summary, unmanned autonomous vessels promise to improve the Korea Coast Guard’s operational effectiveness by enabling continuous coverage, reducing risks to personnel, cutting costs, and providing fast, flexible response options. By leveraging these benefits, the KCG can better fulfill its missions of maritime law enforcement, search and rescue, and territorial waters protection in an era of increasing maritime challenges.

Cybersecurity Threats and Risks to Autonomous Vessels

While unmanned autonomous vessels bring clear benefits, they also introduce significant cybersecurity vulnerabilities. These vessels rely on complex software, communications links, and navigation systems, making them potential targets for cyber attack. Ensuring the cybersecurity of autonomous maritime systems is paramount, as compromises could lead to loss of control, mission failure, or even the vessel being turned against its operators. This section analyzes the primary cyber threats such platforms face, including hacking of control systems and GPS spoofing, among others:

• Remote Hacking and System Intrusions: Autonomous vessels are essentially floating networks of computers and sensors connected via wireless links. This connectivity exposes them to hacking attempts. Malicious actors could attempt to infiltrate the vessel’s control network, either to take unauthorized remote control of the vessel or to disrupt its systems. According to experts, “cybersecurity risks are substantial for autonomous ships due to network vulnerabilities to hacking”gao.gov. The risk is exacerbated by the absence of onboard crew who could detect or troubleshoot an issue in real timegao.gov. A hacker gaining access to an unmanned vessel’s control system could alter its course, disable its engines, or otherwise sabotage its mission. For instance, a surveillance USV could be commandeered to ignore certain vessels or sent off course. These scenarios pose obvious threats to security and safety. As the reliance on connected technologies in shipping grows, such cyber risks are increasinggao.gov. It is therefore crucial that robust encryption, authentication, and intrusion detection systems are in place to prevent unauthorized access and ensure only trusted commands reach the vessel.
• GPS Spoofing and Navigation Signal Manipulation: Unmanned vessels heavily depend on GPS and other satellite navigation for positioning and guidance. GPS spoofing involves broadcasting false GPS signals to mislead a vessel’s navigation system. This is a proven threat in the maritime domain: in one notable incident, over 20 ships in the Black Sea in 2017 found their GPS location inaccurately showing them at an inland airport due to signal spoofingkims.or.kr. An autonomous vessel falling victim to such an attack could be misled into dangerous waters or away from its patrol area without obvious signs of malfunction. Even more dramatically, in August 2019 a British oil tanker in the Strait of Hormuz was reportedly tricked by hackers into deviating course via false coordinates, leading it to inadvertently enter Iranian waters where it was seizedkims.or.kr. These examples highlight how GPS manipulation can be used for “position information interference” against ships. For the KCG, a spoofing attack on an unmanned patrol vessel could allow smugglers or illegal fishing boats to evade detection by misleading the patrol away from the critical zone. Countermeasures like multi-source navigation (e.g. integrating inertial navigation or BeiDou/GLONASS signals) and GPS anti-jamming/spoofing technology are essential to address this threat.
• Jamming and Denial-of-Service Attacks: Related to spoofing is GPS jamming – flooding the area with noise to disable GPS reception – and similar jamming of communications. In April 2016, for example, the West Sea (Yellow Sea) near the inter-Korean maritime border experienced GPS jamming signals that disrupted navigation for dozens of vessels, prompting the Korea Coast Guard to recall about 70 fishing boats to port to prevent accidentskims.or.kr. This incident (attributed to North Korean electronic warfare) demonstrates that radio-frequency interference can pose hazards to maritime traffic. An unmanned vessel under such an attack might lose its positioning capability or control link. Additionally, adversaries could attempt a denial-of-service (DoS) cyber attack on the control center or the vessel’s onboard computers – overwhelming them with traffic or malware to render them unresponsive. Loss of the command-and-control link due to jamming or DoS could effectively blind and deafen an autonomous vessel. Thus, communications security and redundancy (such as backup communication channels, interference detectors, and automated fail-safes that trigger safe modes) are critical components of cybersecurity for USVs.
• Malware and Ransomware Threats: Maritime systems are not immune to ransomware and malware, as seen in 2017 when shipping giant Maersk’s IT and port operations were crippled by the NotPetya ransomware, causing an estimated $300 million in damageskims.or.kr. While that attack targeted corporate and port networks, a similar malware infection on an unmanned vessel’s control software or on the shore-based control station could cause loss of control or misuse of the vessel. Ransomware on a fleet of Coast Guard USVs could lock operators out of their systems until a ransom is paid, directly undermining maritime security operations. Supply chain cyber risks also exist: if the autonomous vessel’s hardware or software is compromised (e.g. through backdoors in navigation software or tampered components), attackers might exploit those in the field. Regular cybersecurity audits, system hardening, and network segmentation are necessary to mitigate malware risks.
• “Cyber-Piracy” and Criminal Exploitation: In the future, experts warn of “cyber pirates” targeting autonomous or minimally-crewed vesselskims.or.kr. Traditional piracy involves boarding and seizing ships; cyber-piracy, however, could involve remotely taking control of a vessel. For instance, a criminal syndicate could hack an unmanned cargo ship or coast guard drone-boat and steer it to a location of their choosing to steal cargo or to use the vessel itself as a weapon. Because there are no crew as a physical deterrent, autonomous ships might be seen as easier prey if their cyber defenses are weakgao.gov. A successful cyber hijacking of a KCG autonomous boat could enable smuggling or facilitate other crimes, essentially turning the Coast Guard’s asset against its mission. The economic and security stakes are high – such attacks could have serious geopolitical and safety consequences. This is why maritime organizations like the International Maritime Organization (IMO) have issued guidelines urging robust cyber risk management for all vessels, including addressing vulnerabilities in navigation and propulsion control systemsgao.gov.

In summary, cybersecurity threats to unmanned Coast Guard vessels are multi-faceted, ranging from direct hacking of command systems and electronic navigational interference to malware and the emerging specter of cyber-piracy. These risks demand that cybersecurity be treated as a core element of deploying autonomous vessels. Without adequate safeguards, the very technologies that give USVs their strength could be turned into liabilities. It is imperative that the KCG anticipates these threats and incorporates strong cyber protections at both the technical and procedural levels, as discussed in later recommendations.

International Comparisons and Best Practices

Countries around the world and international bodies are actively developing strategies to integrate autonomous vessels while mitigating cybersecurity risks. The KCG can draw valuable lessons from these international comparisons in both technology deployment and governance frameworks:

• International Maritime Organization (IMO) Guidelines: The IMO, as the U.N. agency responsible for maritime safety and security, recognizes the importance of cyber resilience on ships. In 2017, the IMO’s Maritime Safety Committee adopted a resolution urging member states to ensure that cyber risks are addressed in ship safety management systems (under the ISM Code)kims.or.kr. The IMO has since issued maritime cyber risk management guidelines and is working on a comprehensive regulatory framework for Maritime Autonomous Surface Ships (MASS). These international guidelines highlight best practices such as risk assessments, network protection, access controls, and incident response planning for vessels’ critical systems. Korea, as an IMO member, has been aligning with these guidelines by raising awareness and developing its own standards for maritime cybersecurity.
• United States – Unmanned Systems and Cyber Rules: The United States Coast Guard and Navy have been at the forefront of testing autonomous vessels for patrol and surveillance. Recognizing the cyber threat, U.S. authorities have implemented strict regulations for maritime cybersecurity. Notably, in July 2025 the U.S. Coast Guard introduced new regulations requiring all major vessels and port facilities under U.S. jurisdiction to adopt Coast Guard–approved cybersecurity plansmaritime-executive.com. These plans must be kept updated, integrated into existing safety frameworks, and overseen by designated cybersecurity officersmaritime-executive.com. The regulations mandate measures such as access controls, encryption, continuous monitoring for intrusions, regular cybersecurity drills, and incident reportingmaritime-executive.commaritime-executive.com. Although these rules apply broadly to maritime operators and not just unmanned vessels, they set a benchmark for the level of rigor expected in securing maritime systems. The U.S. is also investing in R&D for resilient autonomous naval vessels, emphasizing that any deployment of USVs must include secure communications and fail-safe mechanisms to prevent hostile takeovergao.gov.
• Europe and Other Nations: European countries like Norway and the UK have been early adopters of autonomous ship technology and are shaping policy through pilot projects. Norway has conducted tests with autonomous ferries and has issued guidelines that leverage existing maritime laws while granting specific exemptions for unmanned operations under strict conditionsgao.govgao.gov. The United Kingdom and Canada have similarly been providing interim frameworks – for example, Canada treats autonomous vessels under existing rules but offers special certification and requires remote operators to be on standby to take control if neededgao.govgao.gov. A common thread is that these nations emphasize cybersecurity as a key component of autonomous vessel trials. Many have set up dedicated working groups to address issues such as the definition of a “ship’s master” in remote operations and the standards for secure remote control centersgao.govgao.gov.
• Industry and Classification Societies: Beyond governments, international classification societies (e.g. ABS, DNV, and IACS) have developed guidelines for the design and operation of autonomous and remotely-controlled vessels, including cyber resilience standards. For instance, the International Association of Classification Societies (IACS) released unified requirements (UR E26/E27) addressing cyber resilience for ships’ onboard systems, which would apply to newbuild vessels including autonomous ones. These standards call for incorporating network security in vessel design, hardening of software, and procedures for maintaining cyber hygiene throughout a vessel’s life cycle. Similarly, alliances of shipping companies such as BIMCO have published industry cyber security best practiceskims.or.kr. The KCG can reference these global standards to ensure any unmanned vessels it deploys meet internationally recognized safety and security benchmarks.

Overall, the international community’s experiences suggest that while the technology for autonomous vessels is advancing rapidly, governance and cybersecurity measures must evolve in parallel. Countries that have proceeded with autonomous vessel initiatives often do so in a controlled manner: limited trials, case-by-case approvals, and close monitoring of cyber safeguards. The KCG should likewise adopt a cautious and standards-based approach, learning from global best practices to avoid reinventing the wheel. By studying how others integrate USVs into legal and operational frameworks – particularly how they mandate cybersecurity and operator oversight – Korea can develop its own robust framework that harmonizes with international norms and ensures mutual recognition (important for vessels that may operate across borders).

Policy Recommendations for Secure Implementation

To safely capitalize on unmanned autonomous vessel technology, the Korea Coast Guard and relevant government agencies should implement a comprehensive set of policies and safeguards. Based on the analysis of benefits, threats, and international practices above, the following policy recommendations are proposed to ensure secure and effective deployment:

1. Integrate Cybersecurity from the Design Phase: Cybersecurity must be treated as a foundational requirement in all stages of acquiring or developing KCG autonomous vessels. This includes secure design architecture (hardened hardware and software, redundant systems), strong encryption and authentication for all command/control links, and built-in fail-safes. The goal is to make the vessel resilient against hacking attempts and to prevent unauthorized takeovers. For example, control commands should be encrypted and verified, and any anomalous or unverified instructions should trigger an automatic return-to-safe-mode or remote shutdown. By addressing cyber vulnerabilities in navigation and propulsion control systems, as per IMO guidelinesgao.gov, the KCG can reduce the attack surface available to adversaries.
2. Establish a Dedicated Maritime Cybersecurity Unit: The KCG (in coordination with the Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries and other agencies) should establish a dedicated team or unit responsible for the cybersecurity of maritime assets. This unit would set security standards for unmanned vessels, conduct regular vulnerability assessments and penetration testing, and monitor threats. It would also collaborate with national cyber agencies and the defense sector to share intelligence on emerging threats (e.g. new GPS spoofing techniques or malware targeting marine systems). Continuous monitoring of USV operations via a Security Operations Center (SOC) can help detect intrusions or anomalies in real time. This aligns with the U.S. practice of appointing Cybersecurity Officers for vessels and facilitiesmaritime-executive.com, ensuring there are clear points of accountability and expertise for cyber defense.
3. Develop Comprehensive Protocols and Training: The KCG should issue standard operating procedures (SOPs) and manuals specific to unmanned vessel operations, with an emphasis on cyber incident response. All personnel involved in operating or overseeing autonomous vessels must receive specialized training in recognizing and handling cyber incidents. This includes remote operators, engineers, and decision-makers. Regular drills and exercises should be mandated – simulating scenarios like a GPS spoofing incident or a malware attack on the control station – to test readiness and response effectiveness. These drills echo the new requirement in the U.S. for biannual cybersecurity drills and training for maritime personnelmaritime-executive.com. A well-trained crew (even if onshore) is the first line of defense against cyber threats, capable of quickly isolating affected systems or switching to manual control if needed.
4. Legislate and Regulate Autonomous Vessel Security: Korea should update its maritime laws and Coast Guard regulations to reflect the advent of autonomous vessels. This may involve amending existing laws like the Maritime Security Act or enacting new regulations that define standards for unmanned vessel certification, operation, and cybersecurity. As experts have suggested, governments should not leave cyber protection solely to private entities; instead, government-level measures and guidelines are urgently neededkims.or.kr. For instance, regulations could require any operator of an unmanned vessel (be it the KCG or a civilian entity in the future) to adhere to cybersecurity norms, report incidents, and undergo periodic audits. The legal framework should also clarify liability and jurisdiction issues in case of cyber incidents involving unmanned vessels. By incorporating these requirements into law and policy, the KCG ensures that security is not optional but mandatory.
5. Enhance International and Inter-Agency Cooperation: Cyber threats in the maritime domain are borderless – a GPS spoofing signal or hacker can originate from outside Korea’s waters. Therefore, the KCG should work closely with international partners and domestic agencies. Internationally, this means participating in forums on maritime cyber security and autonomous ship regulations (IMO committees, working groups with the U.S. Coast Guard, etc.) to share best practices and potentially coordinate joint responses to incidents. Domestically, cooperation with entities like the Korean National Police’s cyber crime units, the military’s cyber command, and relevant research institutions can bolster defenses. Joint exercises with the Navy or commercial port authorities could be held to practice responses to cyber-attacks affecting multiple stakeholders. Through these collaborations, the KCG can stay ahead of threats and ensure a unified national approach to securing maritime assets.
6. Phase Deployment with Pilot Programs and Testing: It is recommended that the KCG adopts a phased approach in inducting unmanned vessels. Pilot programs should be conducted in limited areas (such as harbor security or controlled coastal zones) to test the technology under close observation. During these pilot operations, extensive data on system performance and attempted intrusions (if any) should be gathered. Lessons learned will inform improvements before wider deployment. Additionally, engaging independent experts to “red team” the autonomous vessel – deliberately attempt to hack or disrupt it in a controlled setting – can expose vulnerabilities that engineers might fix prior to full-scale use. This cautious approach ensures that when USVs are deployed fleet-wide for critical missions, they have gone through rigorous validation for both efficacy and security.
7. Public-Private Collaboration on Technology: The Coast Guard should continue to collaborate with domestic developers (e.g. KRISO, defense contractors) and perhaps startups in the autonomous systems field to foster innovation in secure vessel technology. Investment in R&D for anti-jamming antennas, quantum GPS, AI-based anomaly detection, and resilient communication systems will pay off in having home-grown solutions to cyber threats. Policymakers might consider incentives for developing cybersecure maritime technologies – for example, grants or challenge programs for universities to address specific issues like intrusion detection on marine networks. Such collaborations ensure that the KCG’s requirements are met by the technology industry and that security is built-in from the ground up.
8. Raise Awareness and Build a Cybersecurity Culture: Finally, building a culture of cybersecurity within the maritime sector is crucialkims.or.kr. The KCG should promote awareness campaigns about maritime cyber risks for all seafarers, shipping companies, and even fishermen (many of whom interact with Coast Guard systems like AIS and distress networks). Internally, every member of the Coast Guard involved in operations should appreciate that an autonomous vessel, just like a conventional one, needs vigilant security monitoring. Encouraging a mindset where reporting anomalies (e.g. a slight deviation in course or a sensor glitch) is done without delay will help catch potential cyber issues early. In essence, just as mariners are trained to be on watch for physical dangers, modern operations require them to be on watch for cyber dangers as well.

By implementing these recommendations, the Korea Coast Guard can confidently move forward with unmanned autonomous vessels while minimizing cyber risks. The experience of other nations and expert guidance consistently underscores that cybersecurity is not an auxiliary concern but a central pillar of any autonomous maritime program. The KCG’s proactive measures – from technology safeguards to legal frameworks and training – will not only protect its own assets and missions, but also contribute to the broader goal of maritime cyber resilience in an era when both opportunities and threats at sea are unprecedented.

Conclusion

The introduction of unmanned autonomous vessels into Coast Guard service marks a significant technological advancement for maritime security operations. These vessels promise substantial operational benefits – enhancing surveillance capabilities, safeguarding human life by taking on dangerous tasks, and providing cost-effective, around-the-clock coverage of Korea’s waters. At the same time, this innovation brings to the forefront a new class of cybersecurity challenges that cannot be ignored. Cyber risks such as hacking, GPS spoofing, and other digital attacks pose real threats to the integrity and safety of autonomous operations. As analyzed, incidents around the world have demonstrated the disruptive potential of cyber-attacks on maritime targets, and the stakes are even higher when vessels lack onboard crews to intervene.

However, with careful planning and robust policy measures, these risks are manageable. International experiences show that progress is being made on frameworks and safeguards for autonomous ships – from IMO’s guidelines to nations updating their regulations – offering valuable lessons for Korea. For the Korea Coast Guard, the path forward is clear: embrace the technology for its benefits, but accompany it with stringent cybersecurity measures, thorough testing, and a supportive regulatory environment. The policy recommendations outlined in this report serve as a roadmap to achieve that balance. They call for a holistic approach, combining technical defenses, human preparedness, legal mandates, and cooperative efforts.

In conclusion, unmanned autonomous vessels can become a powerful asset in the KCG’s toolkit for maritime law enforcement and search-and-rescue, amplifying effectiveness in an era of complex maritime challenges. By proactively addressing cybersecurity risks – treating them as a core concern equal to traditional nautical safety – the KCG can ensure that the deployment of these cutting-edge vessels is both secure and successful. This aligned strategy will help protect Korea’s maritime domain from not only conventional threats but also the emerging perils of the digital age, fulfilling the dual mandate of innovation and security. The recommendations herein aim to support policymakers and the Coast Guard in achieving a resilient, forward-looking maritime security posture that leverages autonomy responsibly while guarding against the cyber perils that accompany it.

Sources: The information and analysis in this report were informed by multiple sources, including industry experts on autonomous vessel benefitsship.nridigital.com, documented cases of maritime cyber-attackskims.or.krkims.or.kr, guidelines from international bodies like the IMOgao.gov, and recent policy developments in leading maritime nationsmaritime-executive.com. These references underscore the real-world relevance of the issues discussed and support the credibility of the recommendations offered. The translation has faithfully preserved the intent and formal tone of the original Korean policy document, ensuring that Korean government agencies can confidently use this English version for reference and action.